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Statehood, Secularization, Cooptation: Explaining De-
mocratic Survival in Inter-War Europe - Stein Rokkan's 
Conceptual Map Revisited 
Frank Aarebrot and Sten Berglund∗ 
Abstract: This article addresses itself to the crisis of de-
mocracy in inter-war Europe which saw the breakdown of 
one democratic regime after the other with Czechoslovakia 
as the only survivor case in Eastern and Central Europe by 
the end of this period. lt is cast within the framework of 
Stein Rokkan's seminal conceptual map of Europe which is 
expanded in order to account for countries and variables 
originally not included in his analytical scheure. The analy-
sis leads to the following conclusion: where the state build-
ing was weak and the legacy of empire strong, or where 
secular nation building was still impaired by deeply rooted 
religious sentiments, or where significant segments repre-
senting major cleavages where not coopted into a constitu-
tional compromise, the chances for democratic survival in 
inter-war Europe were slim indeed. The conclusion applies 
to the inter-war era alone, but it clearly has implications for 
contemporary Europe. Noting that statehood and seculariza-
tion ranked high an the agenda of communist Eastern 
Europe, the authors raise the paradoxical question if the 
success of democracy in this part of the world may in fact 
be a by-product of the extent to which the now defunct 
communist regimes were successful in promoting their pet 
goals. 
The reestablishment of sovereign regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and 
the formation of new states in the former Soviet Union since 1989 has created 
new hopes for a democratic Europe. Albeit that these hopes are met with 
healthy amounts of scepticism from the scholarly community, nevertheless a 
sense of euphoria certainly characterized the political scene at the beginning of 
this decade. 
                                                          
∗  Address all communications to Sten Berglund, ABO Akademie, Department of Social 
Sciences, Vöragatan 9, SF-65100 Vasa, Finland. 
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It is all too easy to forget that a similar euphoria on behalf of democratic re-
gimes has occurred once before. After the Versailles Treaty, the Europe of the 
early 1920s saw a number of democratic regimes established within the new 
states built on the ruins of the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian and 
the Ottoman empires. However, twenty years later democratic optimism was 
replaced by a conception of democracy as a beleaguered form of government in 
this part of the world clinging to the Atlantic rim. All the states of central and 
Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Switzerland and Czechoslovakia had 
fallen to various forms of authoritarian and totalitarian rule. 
Two rather obvious questions may be raised from this rather elementary ob-
servation. To what extent can the inter-war experience be said to have any 
relevance in the present situation? To what extent can this past crisis of democ-
racy be explained or understand in terms of macro oriented structural theories? 
The First question cannot be empirically answered; it calls for speculation. 
But if we explore the second question, and if we arrive at some satisfactory 
structural models, some implications of relevance for the first question may 
still be derived. 
Stein Rokkan's seminal conceptual map of Europe was an attempt to inte-
grate crises in state- and nation-building processes wich conditions for democ-
ratic survival such as the extension of citizenship rights and the establishment 
of stable political cleavages in parliaments and amongst the voting population 
(Rokkan, 1975; 1983). 
Another important and more recent contribution is the notion that the accu-
mulation of crises within a short time span in itself may be detrimental to the 
survival of a democratic regime. We will refer to this proposition as agglutina-
tion theory. Giovanni Sartori's distinction between moderate vs. extreme plural-
ism is one example of such a theory (Sartori, 1966; 1976). Sartori's concern for 
the "Weimarization" of new states strikes a deep chord with the scepticism 
about the survival of democracy in Eastern Europe today within the political 
science community. 
This fear must be contrasted to the Anglo-Saxon developmental optimism 
expressed e.g. in Almond's and Verba's belief in stable democratic develop-
ment (Almond & Verba, 1980; Almond & Powell, 1978; Powell, 1982; Hunt-
ington, 1968). One may even refer to it as a form of Anglo-American ethnocen-
tric blas. A bias also shared by the only political scientist who ever became 
president if the USA, Woodrow Wilson. 
Another bias, prominent in many of the commentaries to the present situation 
in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, is a rather simplistic 
juxtaposition of 'state' vs. 'nation'. Rokkan's analytical scheme goes beyond 
this. He points out that in solving the crises of state- and nation-building, re-
gimes may Break down, but they may also be consolidated. lf this were not the 
case, we could not understand the political contrasts between structurally
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similar pairs such as Bosnia and Switzerland or the Netherlands and Northern 
Ireland. 
But Rokkan's framework includes a third bias. His conceptual map ends 
with the Iron Curtain. He mainly draws an the experience of 18 West and Cen-
tral European states. (Rokkan, 1975, pp. 578-79). 
We will try discuss the survival of democracy in inter-war Europe in an at-
tempt to minimize or at least reduce the above mentioned biases. 
A Revised Conceptual Map of Europe 
Rokkan identifies two dimensions as the basis of his conceptual map of Europe: 
- An East-West axis; based an the strength of city networks and political 
centre formation, and 
- A North-South axis; based an the integration of state and church - 
strong in the Protestant North and weck in the Catholic South (Rokkan 
& Urwin, 1983, p. 30). 
The core of the East-West dimension is a symmetrical triad of states. In the 
centre, city-belt states characterized by strong commercial city networks and 
weck political centres, surrounded by Eastern and Western empire states, char-
acterized by strong political centres and weck commercial city networks. The 
city belt is centred an an axis running from Venice to Flanders across the Alps 
and along the Rhine.1 
As far as the Western empire states are concerned, we will keep Rokkan's 
original classification. Denmark, Britain, France and Spain epitomize early and 
strong European state formation. At the saure time all these states became 
centres of vast overseas empires. 
The concept of Eastem empire states functions less well in our context for 
two reasons. First, it may be argued that parts of these territories include city-
belts of considerable importance. The role of the Danube for Austria-Hungary 
(and for the Ottoman Empire until 1878), the importance of the river system to 
the development of Russia from Novgorod to Kiev and the importance of the 
Baltic cities and the Hanseatic League to the development of Prussia-Germany 
are all cases in point. 
Secondly, it may be argued that these territorial units were primarily integrated 
as early landlocked empires (see figure 1), and that state-building as such was 
secondary to the empire fonnation. A territorial classification of empires must 
take into consideration imperial aspirations and confrontation as a primary 
criterion. Prussia-Germany and Austria-Hungary we will consider
                                                          
1  In a recent paper, focusing an the city belt of the sixteenth century, Pål Bakka (1994) sug-
gests a revision of Rokkan's conceptual map which ties in neatly with our own proposal (cf 
table 1). 
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defence empires, built up militarily over the centuries to defend Europe against 
incursions from the Eurasian steppes. Nevertheless both of those defence sys-
tems went through a considerable state-building experience at least with respect 
to their core territories. The German term Mark covers this concept well and 
Rokkan's term Empire states picks up this dimension. Russia and the Ottoman 
empires we will basically consider external with aspirations to expand into 
Europe.2 These systems are closer in structure to Eisenstadt's concept of his-
torical empires (Eisenstadt, 1963), where the concept of stateness was indeed 
relegated to a subordinate position. 
 
 
 
 
 
At the rim of Rokkan's symmetrical conceptual map he places Western and 
Eastern Periphery states, characterized by weak political centres and late state-
hood. The concept of Eastern periphery states, needless to say, will be mean-
ingless within our revised framework, since the external Empires represent 
Europe's Eastern border. Instead we will employ the term devolved states to the 
territories that gained statehood in the historical process of dismantling the 
empires from 1878 to 1919. Two types of Eastern devolved states may be dis-
tinguished; those devolved from the defence empire states, after the peace 
treaty of Versailles, and those devolved from the external
                                                          
2  This classification is somewhat at odds with the Russian national tradition of portraying 
Russia as a Christian defence empire against yellow and Muslim hordes, as evidenced by 
such concepts as the Byzantine heritage and Moscow as the third Rome. 
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historical empires after the Balkan wars and the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk 
and Versailles. 
The North-South axis in Rokkan's framework is based on the religious status 
of the European territories as they emerged after the peace treaties of West-
phalia and Osnabrück in 1648. The importance of this dimension is, however 
based on later political events, notably the conflict between state and church 
over control of the school system during the nineteenth Century. Needless to 
say this three way classification of countries as Protestant, mixed or secularized 
Catholic and counter reformatory, is too limited for an all European frame-
work. We will include Orthodox as well as Muslim areas in our revised ver-
sion, while retaining the crucial distinction in terms of integration or lack 
thereof between state and church. We will employ a fourfold classification of 
countries according to the relative autonomy of the religious hierarchy from the 
political elite. 
As for the Protestant countries, particularly the Lutheran Evangelical, we 
would argue that they represent total integration and subordination of religious 
leadership to the state. In the mixed Protestant and Catholic countries as well as 
the substantially secularized Catholic and Orthodox countries we would argue 
that the autonomy from religion has given the state an upper hand, albeit that 
church interests exist with a potential for independent influence an the citizens. 
In the counter reformation Catholic countries as well as in the non-secularized 
Orthodox countries, we will argue that there is a potential for dualism between 
religious and secular authority. It should be noted that this potential is higher in 
the counter reformation countries. In the non-secularized Orthodox countries 
this potential for direct independent church opposition to the state is weaker, 
but it is enhanced by traditional ties often of a clientelistic nature. The last 
category comprises the Muslim areas. In these areas secularization is at direct 
odds with the religion. Indeed in modern Turkey this may be considered a 
major political and social cleavage in the society. The possibility of coexistence 
between secularized political forces and fundamentalist Muslims within the 
same regime is very much in doubt. Conflicts will tend to have regime conse-
quences. The application of the above criteria results in a revised conceptual 
map of Europe (Table 1). 
The countries and areas appearing in italics have the common denominator 
that democratic regimes established in the early 1920s did not survive the inter-
war period. With their commitment to parliamentary democracy and their vul-
nerability to the vicissitudes of extreme multi-partism, the constitutions of 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (Dellenbrant, 1994) and Poland (Grzybowski, 1994) 
were inspired by the German Weimar Republic and the Third French Republic. 
The breakdown came in the form of a series of coups and military take-overs: 
in Poland by Marshal Józef Piłsudski in May 1926; in Lithuania by Smetona 
again in 1926; in Estonia by Prime Minister Konstantin Päts in 1934; in Latvia 
by Prime Minister Kärlis Ulmanis in 1934. Hungary experienced parliamentary 
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Table 1 Democratic Survival: A Conceptual Map. 
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democracy for a few short days in the after breakdown of B61a Kun's ill-fated 
Soviet Republic an 1 August 1919, but the democratic government was over-
thrown by Admiral Horthy who made himself temporary regent, pending the 
selection of a royal family (Heinrich, 1986, pp. 21-2). The Hungarian case is 
extreme, but not atypical for the countries or areas appearing in italics in table 
1. With a democratic experience of there years under Stambolisky in 1920-23, 
Bulgaria actually stands out as one of the leading democracies in the Balkan 
area. The royal coups of Romania (1920) and Yugoslavia (1929) are well 
known. The development towards authoritarianism and totalitarianism in Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (Zink, 1992) are even better known. 
Reading the conceptual map diagonally from the South-East corner of the 
North-West comer, we observe that the chances of democratic survival im-
prove. From the above discussion of some of the case, it is clear that there is 
considerable variations in the forms of transition to authoritarianism in the 
cases that failed. Nevertheless the structure of the conceptual map also seems 
to indicate that the two macro dimension of the framework have an impact. A 
pattern clearly emerges. 
The dimensions of Rokkan's original conceptual map as well as those of our 
own revised version, are complex and composite. To further clarify the pattern 
of democratic breakdown and survival, we need to look at the two dimensions 
and attempt to extract the essential components necessary to an explanation of 
the pattern. 
Two Crucial Dichotomies 
For our purpose an essential distinction will be made between those European 
states with a historical tradition of state building and those states which primar-
ily had remained empires at the outset of World War I. Almost all the states 
included in Rokkan's original conceptual map belong to the former category. In 
our framework the states exposed to state building include the Western periph-
ery states, the Western empire states, the city belt states, the Eastern defence 
empire states and the states devolved from the Eastern defence empire states 
after 1918. Despite the fact that we have argued that the Eastern defence em-
pire states have a strong element of imperial identity, we will nevertheless 
argue that certainly Sweden and Prussia-Germany, but also Austria-Hungary, at 
least as for their Austrian and Hungarian core populations, had experienced 
considerable state and nation building prior to World War I. On the other hand, 
we will argue that the external Russian and Ottoman historical empires had 
experienced much more limited state building efforts on part of their rulers. We 
will further argue that the states that had devolved from these empires 
since the latter part of the 19th Century, shared this lack of state
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a shared experience of Roman law, feudalism, statebuilding and relatively early 
national revival. We have labelled this group of states the Charlemagne Heri-
tage, since most of them have been influenced by the existence of the Holy 
Roman Empire in the early Middle Ages. The other group of states, known as 
the External Challengers, consists those contries that do not share these tradi-
tions and have belonged to the Russian or Ottoman empires. It is tempting to 
add that they also share a common Byzantine heritage the strength of which 
varies with the relative importance of Orthodoxy. Moreover the lack of a strong 
feudal tradition has enabled ancient local authority relationships such as kin-
ship and clientelism to survive better than in the rest of Europe to the present 
day. This tendency is admittedly stronger in the South than in the North. 
The North-South dimension has also been dichotomized. We consider the 
strength and autonomy of political authority vis à vis religious leadership to be 
essential. It is religious autonomy as such which is important, but rather the 
consequences thereof in terms of the platform it creates for legitimizing counter 
movements threatening the regime. The first group of countries includes the 
Protestant states and the substantially secularized states. The former could even 
use servants of the church to strengthen bureaucracy, whereas the latter have 
successfully managed to isolate religious interest from governance. The second 
group counts the predominantly Catholic states of the counter reformation, the 
non-secularized Orthodox states and the Muslim countries and areas. In the 
case of the Catholic countries, the conflicting influence from the Ecclesia is 
obvious. In the non-secularized and Muslim countries secularization within the 
regime has proven almost impossible. Secularization in Russia and Turkey 
could only take place after Lenin and Atatürk respectively had overthrown the 
old regimes, and here secularization rather served to strengthen the non-
democratic option much in the same way that religion had legitimized tradi-
tional authoritarianism during the old regimes. When we sort the countries and 
areas according to the two dichotomies a very clear pattern emerges (see Table 
2). 
All the countries which remained democratic at the outset of World War II 
belong in one cell. They share the Charlemagne Heritage and they are all ei-
ther Protestant or substantially secularized. Eire is the only exception being a 
counter reformation country. Moreover one important country, Germany, had 
become a Fascist dictatorship despite its solid position in the group of Protes-
tant/secularized countries with a state building tradition. 
The common factors conducive to democratic survival in the inter-war pe-
riod seem to be closely associated with state building and state autonomy. In a 
sense, Max Weber (1978) would hardly have been surprised at this finding 
given his emphasis on the close association between the consolidation of state 
authority through the monopoly of legitimate violence an the one hand and the 
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Table 2 Democratic Survival: A Classification of European Countries in the 
Inter-War Period. (Short-lived and semi-independent state formations are par-
enthesized.) 
Religious heritage The City Belt, Empire-States External Eastern Historical 
 and states devolved from Empires and States devolved 
 these Empire states. from these Empires. 
 The Charlemagne Heritage The External Challengers 
Predominantly Denmark Estonia 
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State and Church Norway  
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 Great Britain  
 The Netherlands  
 Switzerland  
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Secularized Catholic France Russia (USSR) 
or Orthodox Coun Belgium (Ukraine)
tries Czechoslovakia  
Dominant State   
Catholic Counter Eire Lithuania 
Reformation Coun  Poland 
tries, Orthodox and Spain Romania 
Muslim Countries Portugal Bulgaria 
Continued Dualism Austria Yugoslavia (Serbia) 
between State and Hungary Greece
Ecclesia ltaly  
 (Croatia) Albania 
 (Slovakia) Turkey 
 
 
relative autonomy of the bureaucracy an the other hand, as twin bases for a 
rational form of government. In relation to Rokkan's original emphasis an 
internal differentiation bases an City-structures, our analysis highlights the 
common state and cultural tradition derived from Roman Law, secularized 
power, a strong bureaucratic apparatus and legitimized national identity. These 
factors are by no means absent in Rokkan's work, but our results may suggest 
that an even more immediate connection exists between successful state and 
nation building an the one hand and successful democratic regimes an the 
other. It is tempting to employ Weber's old concept of rationality. 
219 
Macro Context vs Internal Factors 
The contrast to much of the existing literature with its emphasis an internal and 
contemporary factors is rather stunning. To some this can be accounted for by 
the preponderance of case studies rather than comparative works. But as men-
tioned above an number of comparative theories also exists mainly emphasiz-
ing internal factors. Agglutination theories are cases in point. If we apply e.g. 
Sartori's theory to our framework, we should expect at least as a good a fit as 
we have obtained. 
In an early article - which comes closer to theory building than most contri-
butions within this field - Sartori (1966) identifies a number of factors that may 
make the difference between the moderate kind of pluralism in stable democra-
cies and extreme kind of pluralism in unstable democracies: 
- the timing of the franchise (the extension of the suffrage)  
- the timing of proportional representation (PR) 
- the number of cleavages  
- the structure of cleavages the degree of party organization 
The logic is simple and straightforward. A rapid process of democratization 
results in extreme multi-partism. The political market is literally flooded with 
new political entrepreneurs hoping for parliamentary representation. PR repre-
sents a low parliamentary threshold and serves as yet another incentive for the 
hopeful political entrepreneurs. The sooner it is introduced, the more likely it is 
to contribute towards extreme multi-partism. The more dimensions of conflict 
there are in a society and the more complex a cleavage structure it has, the 
more likely it is that it will serve as a niche for a large number of political 
parties; and last, but not least, the more poorly organized the political parties 
are, the more room there would seem to be for more political parties. A low 
level of mass mobilization serves as a yet another incentive for the hopeful 
political entrepreneurs. 
And the other way around, a slow process of democratization makes for 
moderate multi-partism, perhaps even for the British kind of two-party politics. 
Majority representation serves as a barrier against extreme multi-partism; and 
the longer majority representation is retained, the more likely it is that the party 
system will become moderate. The fewer cleavages there are in a society and 
the simpler its cleavage structure remains, the less room there is for the extreme 
kind of multi-party politics; and last, but not least, the better organized the 
established political parties are, the less leeway there is for new political entre-
preneurs in the political arena. A high level of mass mobilization serves as a 
deterrent against fragmentation of the party system. 
When we apply Sartori's model in a crude way to our fourfold table, it is read-
ily seen that democratic survivors as well as breakdown cases include coun-
220 
tries that fulfil Sartori's criteria for agglutination as well cases that do not. 
Table 3 illustrates the application of Sartori's criteria for Norway, Sweden 
and Finland, all classified by us as survivors. Norway and Sweden would 
be predicted as democratic survivors by Sartori's theory as well as by our 
framework, but Finland represents a clear case of agglutination and should 
therefore not have survived as a democratic regime according to the logic 
of Sartori's model.3 
The same exercise can be carried out an the non-survivors in our framework. 
If we compare the major states which emerged out of the defunct Austro-
Hungarian Empire, one cannot help being struck by the demise of democracy 
in the less agglutinated cases of Austria and Hungary and by the survival of 
democracy in Czechoslovakia, a recent entry into the state community as of 
1919 and a clear-cut case of agglutination. 
The Third Factor: Structural and Practical Cooptation 
These examples show that Sartori's criteria do not work as indicators of democ-
ratic survival in the inter-war period. Our framework would seem to work 
somewhat better, but it too fails to account for two of the cases, Germany and 
Eire. According to our model democracy should have survived in Germany and 
should not have survived in Eire. 
We would propose that a third factor be added to our analysis in order to ac-
count for these deviations: the integration of cleavages through meso-level 
cooptation. Two forms of cooptation are well documented in the literature: 
structural cooptation in the form of various types of consociational devices and 
practical cooptation in the form of broadening the Base of the regime by in-
cluding the elites of groups representing cleavages hitherto excluded from 
power. Our basic argument is that successful completion of state building and 
clear autonomy from religious authority were not sufficient to make a state safe 
for democracy in the inter-war period. The survival of democracy also requires 
that the elites of all or most relevant cleavages be integrated into governance 
or into a position of strong influence upon the government. 
The survivors explained by our model in table 2 are all cases either of struc-
tural or practical cooptation of major social elites. Structural cooptation is well 
known in the Netherlands; the great compromise of 1917 and verzuiling
                                                          
3  In all fairness, it should be noted that the logic of our own model is contingent upon the 
original classification and Finland is admittedly a border-line case. In table 1 it was classi-
fied as devolved from an Eastern Defence Empire State, i.e. Sweden of which Finland was 
an integral part until the Swedish-Russian War of 1809, rather than as devolved from an 
Eastern External Historical Empire, i.e. Russia from which Finland seceded in 1917. More-
over, anti-Swedish sentiments dominated Finnish Nationalism at least periodically prior to 
independence from Russia. 
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Table 3 Three Nordic Democratic Survivors Classified by Sartori's Criteria. 
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(Lijphardt, 1968), in Belgium; the familles spirituelles (Lorwin, 1971), in 
Switzerland; Proporz (Lembruch,1967a, 1967b; Dahl, 1966; Kerr, 1972). Prac-
tical cooptation in the form of political compromises are known from Scandi-
navia; the Red-Green compromises (Lindström), from Czechoslovakia; the 
Petka - the Committee of Five (Bradley, 1992; Bankowicz, 1994), from Great 
Britain; the World War 11 government of National Unity and McDonald's 
Labour government (McKenzie, 1964), from France; Léon Blum's Popular 
Front Government and subsequent integration of all parliamentary groups into 
governmental politics. 
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Structural cooptation certainly was not unknown in our deviant German 
case. Thus, the two major parties of the Weimar regime, the Catholic Zentrum 
and Social Democrats had developed a societal organizational network which 
had similarities to e.g. Dutch Verzuiling. (Craig, 1978, pp. 499-511). But con-
trary to die Dutch compromises, the Weimar compromise excluded major 
forces. The exclusion of Communists was maybe not so important as the virtual 
exclusion of the Nationalist, Conservative, rural and Eastern political segment. 
This segment was not removed from competitive politics at the polls, but it had 
little or no incentive to join the constitutional regime compromise. Ort the 
contrary anti-regime sentiment became a progressively more important compo-
nent in the politics of the Right. This withdrawal from the parliamentary bar-
gaining process by a major segment of the country's political and military elite 
makes Germany different from all the above mentioned cases of democratic 
survivors. Even so it is noteworthy that the events leading up Hitler's Machter-
greifung in 1933 took place to a large extent within the procedural framework 
of the constitution. In our context it is important to note that not only Hitler and 
his follower, but also the President of the Republic and Hitler's two predeces-
sors as chancellor - von Papen and von Schleicher - both represented the ex-
cluded segment from the formation of the Weimar republic.4 
Our opposite deviant case - Eire - the only democratic survivor among the 
non-secularized states, can also be explained by our third factor. In the consti-
tutional compromise which paved the way for the foundation of an Irish Re-
public, a major segment was excluded, like in Germany. The Nationalist seg-
ment under the leadership of Eamon de Valera, which refused to accept the 
secession of Ulster, was initially not part of the formation of the democratic 
regime. Like in Germany, this segment subsequently came to power within the 
framework of the constitution and de Valera was elected President of the Re-
public. But unlike Germany, the democratic constitution was not subverted by 
the nationalists. On the contrary, their parti, the Fionna Fail, became the cen-
tral party of the Irish state. It benefitted from the existence un an unresolved 
national issue, Ulster, which contrary to the German grievances, could not be 
expected to be resolved by unilateral action alone. Thus in Eire, a rather pecu-
liar combination emerged: a ruling party which obtained electoral strength by 
advocating a raison d'etat that was definitely not part of the constitutional 
compromise and an opposition deeply committed to that very compromise. 
                                                          
4  1t should be kept in mind that this endevour addresses itself to the survival of democracy as 
such and not to explaining the emergense of various totalitarian and authoritarian forms of 
government. We are well aware that to scholars concerned with i.e. the rise of fascism, 
Germany can hardly be considered a deviant case. For an effort to account for the rise of 
fascism within the framework of a similar comparative conceptual tradition sec Hagtvet & 
Rokkan, 1980. 
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The third factor would thus seem to account for the two deviant cases, Ger-
many and Eire. By the 1930s, German democracy finds itself in a no-win- 
situation with ruling political elite not committed to the constitutional compro-
mise faced by an opposition even less committed to Weimar. At the same time, 
Irish democracy is in a no-lose-situation with a governing not overwhelmingly 
committed to the democratic compromise, but repeatedly returned to power at 
the polls, faced by an opposition whose very existence depends an that very 
compromise. 
Conclusion 
Where the state building was weak and the legacy of empire strong, or where 
secular nation building was still impaired by deeply rooted religious senti-
ments, or where significant segments representing major cleavages were not 
coopted into a constitutional compromise, the chances for democratic survival 
in inter-war Europe were slim indeed. Of our two initial questions we feel that 
this answers the second one about the structural determinants of democratic 
survival. 
Today, all European states again pledge themselves to a democratic form of 
government. Our first question about the relevance of the inter-war experience 
as a means to predict the fate of there fledgling contemporary democracies can 
still be answered only speculatively. We will, however, try to make an assess-
ment based on our structural findings. 
This assessment is indeed paradoxical. If our model is correct, the best pros-
pects for democratic survival can be found where there is a strong tradition of 
statehood and where society has been secularized. But there very criteria were 
an top of the agenda set by the communist regimes, which emerged after World 
War 11. We are therefore faced by the following paradoxical question: Will 
democratic survival in Eastem Europe and the former Soviet Union depend 
upon the extent to which the once ruling communists were actually successful 
in promoting their self proclaimed goal? 
The third factor, elite cooptation, is more dependent upon the political cul-
tures that are emerging now. But, it is no less paradoxical. Some of the tradi-
tions for elite cooptation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are in 
themselves far from democratic. Clientelism, kinship and corruption are hard to 
reconcile with democracy, but may nevertheless fulfil a purpose in the progres-
sion towards democracy. 
These two paradoxes are lessons from the past. It remainst to be seen 
whether the future of Europe will be guided by the logic of the past; or as for-
mer Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko once put it when 
asked about the prospects for nuclear disarmament: "I'm neither an optimist nor 
a pessimist, but 1 would nevertheless like to hope" (Fredriksson, 1982). 
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